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RECENT DECISIONS

are supported by corroborating circumstances, in order that the opportunity to perpetrate fraud upon the courts shall not be presented.
COLLEEN

A. ROACH

Partnership: The Concept of the "Continuing Partnership"The recent Wisconsin case of Adams v. Jarvis' involved a three-man
medical partnership at will, governed by a formal and detailed partnership agreement. Under the rather unique contract, the partnership was
not to terminate at the withdrawal or death of a partner. Instead, until
a full settlement was made in accordance with the agreement, the withdrawing partner or the deceased partner's estate would continue to
participate in partnership profits and losses, but not in the management
of the clinic. A retiring partner would receive any balance standing to
his credit on the books of the partnership, the amount of his capital
account, and that proportion of profits to which he was entitled pursuant to the agreement. It was specifically agreed that on the withdrawal
of any partner the accounts receivable were to remain the property of
the clinic. The books of the firm were not to close until the end of the
fiscal year.
On May 8, 1961, the plaintiff submitted a letter to the partnership
giving notice of withdrawal, declaring the partnership dissolved, and
requesting an accounting. The plaintiff terminated his association with
the firm on June 1. The remaining partners carried on the business of
the firm and refused, by virtue of the agreement, to pay any portion of
the accounts receivable to the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought an action
for a declaratory judgment in the county court, urging that the partnership was dissolved upon his withdrawal and that partnership property,
including accounts receivable, be divided equally among the three partners. The plaintiff reasoned that if the partnership dissolved upon withdrawal, the retiring partner's rights should be determined pursuant to
section 123.372 of the Wisconsin statutes, and the partnership affairs
N.W. 2d 400 (1964). Relevant portions of the partnership
contract were quoted by the court.
2 "Rights of retiring or deceased partner. When any partner retires or dies, and
the business is continued under any of the conditions set forth in [section]
123.36(1), (2), (3), (5) and (6) or [section] 123.33(2) (b), without any settlement of accounts as between him or his estate and the person or partnership
continuing the business, unless otherwise agreed, he or his legal representative
as against such persons or partnership may have the value of his interest at the
date of dissolution ascertained, and shall receive as an ordinary creditor an
amount equal to the value of his interest in the dissolved partnership with interest, or, at his option or at the option of his legal representative, in lieu of
interest, the profits attributable to the use of his right in the property of the
dissolved partnership; provided that the creditors of the dissolved partnership
as against the separate creditors, or the representative of the retired or deceased partner, shall have priority on any claim arising under this section, as
provided by [section] 123.36 (8)."
123 Wis. 2d 453, 127
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wound up pursuant to section 123.33.' The trial court agreed, holding
that the plaintiff's withdrawal constituted a statutory dissolution,4 that
the assets of the clinic should be liquidated, and that the plaintiff's
share would be one-third of the total, including accounts receivable.
The decision of the trial court was reversed by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court. In answering the plaintiff's contention that the partnership dissolved by operation of law at the withdrawal of the plaintiff,
the court said that "while the withdrawal of a partner works a dissolution of the partnership under the statute as to the withdrawing
partner, it does not follow that the rights and duties of remaining
partners are similarly affected." 5 The court went on to say:
The agreement does provide that Dr. Adams shall no longer
actively participate and further provides for winding up the
affairs insofar as his interests are concerned. In this sense his
withdrawal does constitute a dissolution. We conclude, however,
that when the plaintiff, Dr. Adams, withdrew, the partnership
was not wholly dissolved as to require complete winding up of
its affairs, but continued to exist under the terms of the agreement. The agreement does not offend the statute and is valid.'
(Emphasis added.)
Has the court by this language decreed that the partnership was dissolved' at the withdrawal of the plaintiff? If the partnership was not
"wholly dissolved," was a "partial dissolution" effected by the withdrawal? A "partial dissolution" would be an anomaly, considering the
statutory definition of dissolution, s which conforms to section 29 of the
Uniform Partnership Act. The Commissioners' note to this section
furnishes an insight to the term "dissolution," and distinguishes it
from other verbiage relating to the" final phases of partnership life:
In this act dissolution designates the point in time when the
partners cease to carry on the business together; termination is
the point in time when all partnership affairs are wound up;
3 "Application

of partnership property on dissolution. (1) When dissolution is
caused in any way, except in contravention of the partnership agreement, each
partner, as against his co-partners and all persons claiming through them in
respect of their interests in the partnerships, unless otherwise agreed, may
have the partnership properly applied to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus
applied to pay in cash the net amount owing to the respective partners ......
(Emphasis added.) (This statute does not correspond exactly with its counterpart as enacted in Wis. Laws 1915, ch. 358, or Wis. STAT. §§17 2 4(m)-33 (1915),
due to a typographical error which has persisted through the revisions. The
word properly should read property.)
' WIs. STAT. §123.25 (1961) : "Dissolution of partnership defined. (1) The dissolution of a partnership is the change in the relation of the partners caused
by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as distinguished from
the winding up of the business.
(2) On dissolution the partnership is not terminated, but continues until the
winding up of partnership affairs is completed."
23 Wis. 2d at 458, 127 N.W. 2d at 403.
6 Id. at 459, 127 N.W. 2d at 403-04.
7Annot., 55 A.L.R. 2d 1391, 1395 (1957).
1 See note 4 supra.
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winding up, the process of settling partnership affairs after
dissolution.9
There is no doubt that in this case the partners did cease to carry on
the business together on June 1, 1961. Therefore, considering the definition quoted, the Adams-Jarvis partnership must have dissolved on
that date. 10 Had the court unequivocally granted the plaintiff's first
contention; namely, that the partnership dissolved on the effective date
of the withdrawal, it would'not follow that the clinic assets need be
liquidated under the applicable statutes." The contract stated that the
partnership shall not terminate on withdrawal, but no specific provision
was made against dissolution. The paragraph of the agreement which
defines "withdrawal" as "any situation in which a partner leaves the
partnership, at a time when said partnership is not dissolving, pursuant
to a written agreement of the parties to do so" could be said to be an
attempt to preclude dissolution on withdrawal, if not read in the light
of the rest of the agreement. A specific provision was made for dissolution by agreement of the parties whereby business assets would be
liquidated. It appears, therefore, that the definition merely speaks of
"withdrawal" as any time when a partner leaves the firm when the firm
is not liquidating its assets under a general agreement of the partners
to close the clinic. The court held that the contract did not offend the
partnership chapter of the statutes. The provision that the accounts receivable were to remain the property of the clinic was not construed
2
to be void as a forfeiture against public policy.'
Considering these determinations, the plaintiff's contention that the
assets should be distributed pursuant to the applicable statutes is without merit. These statutes outline the rights of the partners and provide
rules for settling accounts on dissolution. The statutes contemplate a
liquidation of partnership assets which, under the Adams-Jarvis agreement, would not be necessary at the death or retirement of a partner.
The assets of the firm will be used by the remaining members, and the
retiring partner will receive his settlement under the contract. A liquidation would be necessary only if the partners agreed to close the
clinic. The statutes themselves contain express limitations on their
applicability; ziz., "unless otherwise agreed,"' 3 or "subject to any agree9 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT §29, Commissioners' Note.
10 Egner

1

v. States Realty Co., 223 Minn. 305, 26 N.W. 2d 464 (1947) ; Harwell v.
Cowan, 175 Ga. 33, 165 S.E. 19 (1932) ; 40 Am. JuP. PARTNERSHIP §242 (1942).
But cf. California Employment Stabilization Comm'n v. Walters, 64 Cal. App.
2d 554, 149 P. 2d 17 (1944) ; Moore v. May, 117 Wis. 192, 94 N.W. 45 (1902) ;
68 C.J.S. Partnership§347 (1950). The Moore decision was handed down prior
to the adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act in Wisconsin.
Devlin v. Rockey, 295 F. 2d 266 (7th Cir. 1961) ; 68 CJ.S. Partnership§§243,

246 (1950).

Wis. 2d at 459, 127 N.W. 2d at 404; see also McPherson v. J. E. Surrine &
Co., 206 S.C. 183, 33 S.E. 2d 501 (1945) ; 17A C.J.S. Contracts §320 (1963) ; 68
C.J.S. Partnership§246 (1950).

1223

13 Wis. STAT.

§§123.33, .37 (1961).
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ment to the contrary." 14 Therefore, a thoughtfully drafted agreement
supplying a different method of ascertaining a partner's rights will
operate to preclude the general statutory rules governing account-

ability.' 5
The Adams-Jarvis partnership dissolved and proceeded to a winding-up pursuant to the partnership contract. A question that immediately arises is whether the partnership terminated notwithstanding a
contract provision to the contrary. In other words, is the two-man
partnership which was in existence after the three-man partnership
wound up its affairs the same partnership or a different one? This
question is important, because it involves the controversy over the
entity versus the aggregate theory of partnership law. The aggregate
theory sees the partnership as an association of individuals which has
no existence distinct from the persons who compose it.16 Many other
jurisdictions recognize the partnership as an entity distinct from its
members.1 7 It seems to the author that if the original three-man partnership never terminated, but continued and is identical with the twoman partnership, then the clinic can be viewed as a separate entity,
distinct from its members. However, if two technically distinct partnerships are involved, the court has reasoned consistently with the aggregate theory. It was not necessary in the instant case to decide whether
a termination took place; indeed, the court did not openly deal with the
question. Neither theory was mentioned by the court, but inferences
might be seen in the following language:
We conclude the parties clearly intended that even though a
partner withdrew, the partnership and the partnership business
would continue for the purposes for which it was organized....
The agreement contemplates a partnership would continue to
exist between the remaining partners even though the personnel
[W]hen the plainconstituting the partnership was changed ....
tiff, Dr. Adams, withdrew, the partnership was not wholly dissolved so as to require complete winding up of its affairs, but
continued to exist under the terms of the agreement.' 8 (Emphasis added.)
Wisconsin has always followed the aggregate approach to partnership
law in substantive matters.' 9 Despite the language quoted, there seems
little basis for arguing that the court views the partnership as an entity
§123.35 (1961).

14

WIS. STAT.

15

In re Eddy's Estate, 175 Misc. 1011, 26 N.Y.S. 2d 115 (1941) ; Annot., 2 A.L.R.
2d 1084, 1092 (1948) ; see also authorities cited note 11 supra.

1837 MARQ. L. REv. 66, 69 (1953).

Ibid.
Is 23 Wis. 2d at 458-59, 127 N.W. 2d at 403-04.
17

19 Westby v. Bekkedal, 172 Wis. 114, 178 N.W. 451 (1920) ; Thomas v. Industrial

Comm'n, 243 Wis. 231, 10 N.W. 2d 206 (1943); and Kalson v. Industrial
Comm'n, 248 Wis. 393, 21 N.W. 2d 644 (1946); all cited in 37 MARQ. L. REV.
66 (1953). The Kalson case deals with a partnership as an entity for purposes

of the workmen's compensation statutes.
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distinct from its members. This is especially true considering that
neither theory was mentioned in the opinion. The court has, however,
been urged to adopt the entity approach to partnership law,2 and the
language of this case could be used to argue that the court is leaning
in the direction of the entity theory. The court's statement that "the
partnership . . . continued to exist" 21 (emphasis added) could be con-

strued to mean that the old partnership "entity" survived the withdrawal of a member. It is more reasonable to assume, however, that
the court still regards the partnership as an aggregate of individuals
having no recognized separate existence except for certain procedural
matters. It would follow, then, that the Adams-Jarvis partnership dissolved, wound up in accordance with the contract, and at least technically terminated, 22 and that a new partnership sprang up in its place
consisting of the two remaining members. This new partnership is
governed by the old agreement. Any change in membership, as by the
admission of a new member, will send the partnership through its tech23
nical evolution, and a new, legally distinct partnership will result.
The "continuing partnership" is a useful form of business organiza24
tion, especially for firms whose membership is constantly changing.
It would be impractical, indeed, for a firm to be forced to liquidate its
assets each time a member leaves the firm and each time a new partner
is admitted. The "continuing partnership" provides a means whereby
a firm may continue its day to day business without the impediment
of a.statutory settlement of accounts. A specific contractual provision
will eliminate the necessity of dividing the accounts receivable each
time a new member is admitted or an old member withdraws. 2 5 It is

essential, however, that careful consideration be given to the drafting
of the agreement, in order that it be kept consistent with the theory of
partnership law.

THOMAs A.
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Evidence: Attorney-Client Privilege: Communications with Insurance Agent- In Jacobi v. Podevels,' an automobile negligence
case, both drivers testified during the trial that they were traveling at
a rate of speed below the legal limit of twenty-five miles per hour. In
a statement given to his insurance company's agent, however, respondent admitted that he was traveling at a speed of thirty miles per hour,
and also included damaging remarks concerning his lookout at the time
of the accident.
2037 MARQ. L. REv. 66 (1953).

2123
Wis. 2d at 459, 127 N.W. 2d at 404.
22
Egner v. States Realty Co., note 10 supra; 40 Am. JuR. Partnership§197 (1942).
23 Annot., 45 A.L.R. 1240 (1926) ; 40 Am. JuR. Partnership§233 (1942).
24 Millikan, The Continuing Partnership Whether and When, 28 Los ANGELES B.
BULL. 123 (1953).

Hirsh, The Medical Partnership,13 DE PAUL L. REv. 28 (1963).
123 Wis. 2d 152, 127 N.W. 2d 73 (1964).
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